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Participative Decision-Making 
in a Consultative Committee Context 
Malcolm Warner 
This paper attempts to look at consultative participation, 
in a British setting, of bodies on which trade union « repré-
sentatives » sit at the national level, together with committee-
members from other industrial interest-groups, government 
departments and independents. 
INTRODUCTION 
A récent paper has observed that « no system has achieved effective 
participation at ail three levels of the industrial system, i.e. below, within 
and above the plant. Only in Britain has consultative participation been 
firmly established at the industrial and national levels, but little progress 
is being made in this direction in Yugoslavia, and not much has been 
accomplished in West Germany > (King and Van de Vall, 1969 : 17). 
This paper attempts to look at consultative participation, in a 
British setting, of bodies on which trade union « représentatives > sat 
at the national level, together with committee-members from other in-
dustrial interest-groups, (such as employers' trade associations), Gov-
ernment departments and independents. Equal numbers of thèse four 
catégories were involved, plus an independent chairman who was in ail 
cases not a. trade union figure. (Thèse were about the same size as the 
average for Workers' Councils in Yugoslavia, to which passing référence 
will be made). The British consultative committees studied, operated 
at national industrial level and consisted in most cases, of twenty three 
members, which was « between 20 
and 22 » (Blumberg, 1968 : 198). 
The organization set sampled, com-
prised of twenty-one committes and 
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additional working parties. The researcher directly observed the preceed-
ings of nine committees, but data from observations in most of the 
other committees' meetings was available and was incorporated into 
the research findings. Anonymity of sources had been preserved through-
out, as promised to the respondents : in addition, it was agreed that 
spécifie ratings or score would not be reported for individual participants 
or committees, for reasons of confidentiality. It is hoped that this paper 
will be useful in suggesting ways in which group cohésion may be 
improved in the représentative bodies involved in industrial enterprises, 
and at other levels above the firm (say at national level) where 
participative consultation takes place. We hope to shed light on the 
questions of numbers involved in participative consultation sitting on 
committees and the degree of représentation, and conflict-resolution, 
and how far this can be affected by différent leadership-styles of Com-
mittee Chairmen. 
The study of effective group processes has taken into considération 
a wide variety of committees in récent expérience. A degree of confor-
mity to group norms might be considered necessary for smooth func-
tioning, but what are the necessary conditions for group cohésion, and 
how are thèse specifically applicable to participative consultation, in a 
public setting? Intégration, one view has suggested, is a very important 
aspect of the problem : — 
«The necessity for intégration in any social System anses from the 
differentiation among its various éléments. Most importantly there 
is a differentiation among subgroups and among individual positions, 
together with the rôles that flow therefrom. 
A committee faces the problem, how shall thèse diverse éléments 
be made to mesh together or function in support of one another? 
No political System (or subsystem) is perfectly integrated; yet no 
political system can survive without some minimum degree of inté-
gration among its differentiated parts. 
Committee intégration is defined as the degree to which there is a 
working together or meshing together or mutual support among its 
rôles and subgroups. Conversely, it is also defined as the degree to 
which a committee is able to minimize conflict among its rôles and 
its subgroups, by heading off or resolving the conflicts that arise. 
A concomitant of intégration is the existence of a fairly consistent 
set of norms, widely agreed upon and widely followed by the mem-
bers. Another concomitant of intégration is the existence of control 
mechanisms (i.e. socialization and sanctioning mechanisms) capable 
of maintaining reasonable conformity to norms. In other words, the 
more highly integrated a committee, the smaller will be the gap 
between expected and actual behaviour». (Fenno, 1962: 310-324). 
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The question of intégration cannot, however, be separated from 
the problem of group size which can be very relevant to the decision-
making processes involved. We shall firstly briefly consider its relevance, 
before developing our analysis of consultative committee interaction. 
It has recently been argued that the « greater effectiveness of relatively 
small groups — the 'privileged' and 'intermediate' groups is évident from 
observation and expérience as well as theory ». (Oison, 1965: 53). 
Indeed « organizations so often turn to the small group ; committees, 
sub-committees, and small leadership groups are created, and once creat-
ed they tend to play a crucial rôle ». (1965 : 53) We would hypothesize 
that the larger and less homogeneous the group, the greater the problem 
of achieving group intégration and/or effectiveness, whatever the goals 
involved. Earlier research had suggested that « action-taking » groups 
and sub-groups tend to be much smaller than their « non-action-taking » 
counterparts. (1965 : 54). In one sample cited, the average size of the 
« action-taking » sub-group was 6.5 members, whereas the average size 
of the «non action-taking» counterpart was 14. (1965:54) It has 
also been suggested that performance in group of 5 was better than in 
those of 12 — and that « small, centripetally organized groups usually 
call on and use ail their énergies while in large groups forces remain 
much oftener potential ». (1965 : 54) 
It dœs not follow, however, that larger committees are necessarily 
at a disadvantage because of their size, which is greater than that pointed 
out in the research above for action-taking, because they can often 
divide into working parties and sub-committees. Thèse are always smaller 
than the total committee, and the size of the larger cornmittees may 
reflect the fact that they are not designed to carry out executive fonctions 
themselves. We would hypothesize that formai sub-grouping assists group 
intégration, at the very least, where large committees are involved, and 
where the représentation of broad interests produced membershïp bloc 
heterogeneity, which may hold for the bodies studied, and indeed also 
for the governing councils of self-managing enterprises. 
SIZE AND GROUP FUNCTIONING 
There is a good deal of évidence that groups larger than a handful 
of individuals cannot take décisions promptly, even though this may be 
in their mutual interest. On the whole, the size of consultative committees 
we reasoned (as we began our field-work), seems to be governed by 
two requirements which pull in opposite directions. First, that they 
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should be sufficiently représentative of the interests involved and, sec-
ondly that their membership should be such as to give them access to 
the « organized channels of communication». A drastic réduction in the 
size of the committees would probably eut them off from some important 
sources of information, lead to the charge that they were no longer 
représentative, and make them dépendent on fewer, and possibly less 
effective, means of communication. 
The current research reported hère on the twenty or so committees 
examined suggests that consultative bodies of the type studied are too 
large to effectively carry out detailed work, and it is presumably for 
this reason that the working party system has developed (cf. on 
Yugoslav Workers' Commissions, see Gorupic & Paj, 1970 : 13). As 
Fenno notes : « If one considers the main activity of a political system 
to be decision-making, the acid test of its internai intégration is its 
capacity to make collective décisions without flying apart in the process. 
Analysis of committee intégration should focus directly, therefore, upon 
its sub-groups and the rôles of its members ». (Fenno, 1962: 363). 
Working parties and such sub-groups it can be argued give the benefits 
of the division of labour, concentration on a spécifie task, small size, 
greater flexibility of membership, sélection based on expertise, in ad-
dition to which their members often give up considerably more time to 
work than a member who is not involved in a working party and 
simply attends the meetings of the full committee. This dœs not mean, 
however, that the committees are simply « rubber stamps » giving a 
formai seal of approval to whatever their working parties produce. 
They hâve a number of important functions. Logically, the first function 
of committees is to décide upon a programme of work. No matter how 
an issue is raised, before any action is taken the committee must assess 
its priorities and make a décision about the type of problem it thinks 
worth takling. That this is a real décision is indicated by the diversity 
of such problems which the committees examine and the work they do. 
A second function, following from the first, is to décide how to takle 
the problem, whether by a desk study carried out by staff, by a working 
party drawing on experts from « outside » as well as from inside under 
the direction of a steering committee. 
Whichever method is chosen, there is an obligation for consultative 
committees as a whole to monitor their progress. Finally, the committee 
must receive a report, consider it, décide whether to approve it or not, 
and then décide in what form it should be « made public » and to whom 
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its contents should be communicated. We must next, therefore, look at 
the decision-making process itself. 
CO-ORDINATING COUNCILS AND CONSULTATIVE COMMUTEES 
A récent study of Coordinating Councils at the urban level in U.S. 
setting has developed a theoretical framework which is directly relevant 
to the présent analysis of consultative committee meetings. (Mott, 1968). 
The relationship between the organizations represented on the Council 
were a mixture of co-operation, compétition and conflict. The strategy 
adopted by the Council to secure greater coordination was to identify 
and deal with areas of mutual interest and to avoid as far as possible 
areas of conflict. The Council proceeded according to a « norm of 
unanimity >. (Feno, 1962 : 367). The relevant hypothesis to be extracted 
is that this strategy and modus operandi developed because the consé-
quence of internai conflict for the work of the Council would hâve been 
very damaging and might even hâve threatened its survival. (1962 : 367). 
There is clear similarity between this theoretical model and the way 
in which consultative committees function. The latter are also involved 
in seeuring coopération among diverse bodies which are usually inter-
dependent. They dépend for their effecîiveness on voluntary coopération 
and persuasion, because they hâve neither the resources nor the au-
thority to secure compliance. (Hère there is a contrast with councils in 
self-managing enterprises). Manifest conflicts occur surprisingly infre-
quently, and when they do even the most trivial incidents are dealt with 
in the most circumspect way. The implication is that the group members 
feel that if they are to move at ail, they must move together and they 
fully recognise the likely effects on the committees of incautiously tack-
ling controversial questions. Of course, conflict cannot be completely 
eliminated or precisely anticipated and, since it cannot be suppressed 
if it does arise, there must be some way of relatively controlling and 
channelling it. In effect, the search for consensus by the Chairmen 
allowed the norm of unity to function meaningfully. (Edelstein & Warner, 
1971 : 179-188). 
Conflict is regulated in two ways, by the intervention of the Chair-
men, and by the acceptance by ail participants of the « norm of unanim-
ity » mentioned earlier. When a Chairman intervenes in a meeting to 
mitigate conflict, he often does this by using arguments which embody 
the values underlying the consultative process. It is sometimes argued 
that committees should face up to conflicts directly, rather than approach 
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controversial questions in more round-about ways. What this argument 
overlooks is that the context does not provide the conditions for conflict 
resolutions ; there is no basis of joint-control either (cf. the Yugoslav 
case described in Rus, 1970, 148 : 160). This, has been argued, 
requires the intervention of some external authority or a récognition by 
the participants of overriding mutual interests which can form the 
basis for bargaining among them. (Boulding, 1962). Of course, areas 
of mutual interest are often not immediately apparent. The views of 
group members must be discovered, and the measure of their support 
for work in this area must be gauged before embarking on a study. Subse-
quently, their interest and involvement in it must be maintained and, 
finally, their commitment will influence the degree to which the outcomes 
are accepted. Discussion of topics such as thèse inevitably raises questions 
of leadership and participation, to which we will next turn as crucial 
factors in the group intégration process. 
LEADERSHIP STYLE AND COMMUTEE INTEGRATION 
A systematic discussion of leadership necessarily requires a clear 
analytical framework and a précise concept of what leadership involves 
for a wide range of cases. Récent research on leadership styles provides 
a possible approach. (Fiedler, 1967 : 498-503). This defines leader-
ship as « a personal relationship in which one person directs, co-ordi-
nates and supervises others in the performance of a common task » ; 
it suggests that the « style » in which leadership functions may be per-
formed varies between two extrêmes. At one extrême the leader may 
«tell people what to do and how to do it». At the other extrême he 
may «share his leadership responsibilities with his group members and 
involve them in the planning and exécution of the task». (1967 : 498-
503). There are, of course, various degrees of leadership style between 
thèse two extrêmes, and there is research évidence which suggests that 
in some circumstances each style is associated with appropriate group 
performance. The crucial question is how to identify the spécifie situa-
tions to which différent leadership styles are suited. It has, in fact, been 
suggested that there are three major situational variables which affect 
the ease or difficulté of securing coopération from a group ; leader-
member relations, task structure and the leader's position power (1967 : 
498-503). Leader-member relations are considered to be the most im-
portant variable. It would certainly be useful if someone carried out 
empirical work on a range of self-managing enterprises to see how far 
thèse factors affected decision-making in Workers' Councils, although 
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Adizes (1971) has looked at the leadership variable in two Yugoslav 
firms. The degree to which group members trust and like the leader, in 
Fiedler's view, has a strong influence on how willing they are to 
accept guidance and initiatives from him. Observation of meetings sug-
gests that consultative committees range fairly widely from those which 
hâve relatively good leader-member relations to those in which the relations 
are relatively poor. In some committees there appeared to be few rés-
ervations about allowing the chairmen and officiais discrétion to initiate 
action. 
The next most important relevant variable we studied is the degree 
of « task structure », the degree to which the task of the group is 
clearly defined and the means of achieving its goals. A task which can 
be presented to members as clearly defined enables the leader to exert 
influence more effectively than a vaguely defined or ambiguous task. 
Again, the committees which we observed varied in the degree to which 
their tasks were « structured ». At différent stages of its development 
or in différent areas of its work, the tasks which committees face may 
vary in the degree to which they are clearly specified. One of the reasons 
for this is that to a considérable extent consultative committees are 
within limits « self-governing », and it was évident in the meetings that 
it is sometimes difficult for them to décide on the areas in which they 
should work and how to tackle the problems. When they hâve made 
up their minds what to do, the tasks are then more clearly specified. 
Third, the powers associated with the leader's position itself hâve an 
impact on his influence. If a leader has the power to décide on the 
membership of his group or the power to allocate resources on behalf 
of the group, he is in a stronger position than one who dœs not, for 
example. Consultative committee Chairmen were observed to hâve few 
powers of this kind, and in gênerai their « positive power » is low. The 
leader also opérâtes as a gate-keeper, and may be instrumental in build-
ing a consensus. Indeed, a « major problem is that while some voluntary 
associations, such as unions, use formai voting Systems in committees, 
many business and administrative organizations (such as consultative 
bodies) do not, and prefer to use informai ways of seeking consensus. 
Thèse hâve the virtue of simplicity, speed and scope for the leardership 
of the chairman or leading clique. In this sensé, they are probably less 
démocratie. 
The informality of a voting System may be broken down concept-
ually into the decision-making and the pre decision-making phases. When 
the criteria for when a décision has been reached are well established 
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and invariably applied, the informai électoral system merges with one 
of the recognised formai Systems and the effects of informality as such 
would seem negligible. However, in practice informai decision-making 
involves variable criteria, or perhaps idéal norms of majority rule or 
consensus with the point of attainment interpreted by a leader func-
tioning as gate-keeper over the group process. At worst, there may be 
a manipulation of the group through false reports of group sentiment. 
In the normal course of informai group decision-making, one would 
expect numerous instances of misperception by group leaders in the 
direction of their own points of view. » (Edelstein & Warner, 1971 : 
185-186). 
Formally, the leaders of committees are in fact independent Chair-
men, in so far as they are expected to hâve no material interest in the 
area of problem-solving with which their committees are concerned. In 
practice the formai position is modified first, because Chairmen are 
usually only appointed after very extensive soundings and consultations 
hâve been carried out to find people who are acceptable to ail the 
sub-groups of the committee. Second, by the fact that in a few cases 
the Chairmen are, or hâve been, involved in some capacity in their own 
relevant organizational contexts. (In the self-managed enterprise, thèse 
would always be intra-organization). It sometimes seems that because 
of the difficulties involved in finding a man who dœs not arouse ob-
jections in one quarter or another, acceptability rather than independence 
is the operative sélection criterion. Nevertheless, the process of appoint-
ment does give the Chairman some independence of his committee because 
it establishes his right of access to outside authority on behalf of his 
committee, should he think it necessary. From what has been said 
above, it would be mistaken to expect that a single leadership style 
would be appropriate to ail consultative committees or even to the same 
one at différent times. In practice, Chairman were observed to adapt 
their leadership styles to suit the conditions which prevail in their com-
mittees. It was not uncommon for Chairman to explicitly shift from a 
directive, active leadership style employed when dealing with relatively 
routine business, to a non-directive, conciliatory style in dealing with 
more important matters when there is a need to carry the members with 
him. 
The leader's rôle was observed to be very flexible even in the most 
formai part of the pre-meeting « soundings out » of members or groups 
of members : « The peak of formality during the discussion phase of 
decision-making may be very informai indeed. There may be no pre-
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arranged time or place for meetings, and once under way the discussion 
may be subject to few if any rules, implicit or otherwise. In an organi-
zational society there are ordinarily rules which, if held in abeyance, 
may nevertheless be appealed to ; for example, the rudiments of parlia-
mentary procédure. However, thèse are frequently not applied by what 
is presumably mutual consent, again as interpreted by the group process 
gatekeeper. One common semi-formal variant of parliamentary procédure 
involves a Chairman who focuses discussion, recognizes discussants, dis-
courages digressions and lengthy discourses (presumably impartially) 
ail without encouraging formai 'motions' (formai proposais by individual 
members for group action). The présentation of proposais is of key 
importance, since it is difficult for the group to recognize what may 
only be a speaker's passing thought (perhaps stated apologetically). 
Thus, it would appear that the absence of rules for the calling of 
meetings or the régulation of discussion would ordinarily favour the 
policies and tenure of an established leadership, or at least of whœver 
happened to be in control at the meeting ». (Edelstein & Warner, 1971 : 
185-186). It is clear that many trade union executive committees for 
example, overcome this by the use of very spécifie standing orders. 
At a more gênerai level, an attempt was made to assess the 
prédominant leadership styles adopted by Chairmen, and make an as-
sessment of the group-task situations to which they related. (Fiedler, 
1967:498-503). Following this analytical framework outlined earlier, 
marked variations in the prédominant leadership styles in différent 
committees were not observed to be homogeneous, some being more 
active and « directive >, others « non-directive » and conciliatory. In 
fact, there is a gênerai but not invariable tendency towards a « non-
directive » conciliatory style of leadership in consultative committees. 
This could be seen as being more appropriate for group intégration. It 
could be argued that some Chairmen do not adopt the leadership style 
which was most relevant, but the fact that the « discrepancies » are 
almost ail in the same direction seem to rule out this explanation. 
However, there is another reason behind the tendency of the Chairmen 
to adopt « non-directive » conciliatory leadership styles, even when they 
are « inappropriate ». This explanation is based partly on the way 
consultative committees are composed and partly on the way they 
operate. Because consultative committees consist of individuals drawn 
from a variety of organizations and backgrounds, and because their 
usefulness is conditional on keeping them together and integrated, there 
is inevitably a need to be sensitive to différences that might émerge. 
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Moreover, Chairmen must take account of leaders of sub-groups in the 
committees. (Fenno, 1962:363). However, in some committees the 
pattern of leadership on ail sides is reasonably easy to identify. 
This pluralistic leadership pattern seems somewhat to simplify the 
task of Chairmen in managing the committee, and it was very évident 
in those meetings where the normal pattern of sub-group leadership 
breaks down that the Chairman feels unable to press the committee 
members to reach a décision. 
The character of the committee leadership observed is reinforced 
by the way the work of the body is done. Not only are the leadership 
fonctions of planning, policy making etc., shared between the Chairman 
and the committee officiais, but they are also shared with the Chairmen of 
Working Parties. (In Yugoslav firms, this would also be a common 
phenomena on the panoply of représentative bodies). Because the inde-
pendent members of the committees are often appointed to thèse positions, 
an extra dimension is added to the leadership structures of the committee. 
Even if it might seem a more directive, controlling style of leadership 
would sometimes be more appropriate to the group-task situation in 
which a consultative body finds itself, it is clear that the pluralistic leader-
ship structure common to ail and deriving from their composition and 
method of working often constrains Chairmen to adopt a non-directive 
style, (cf. Adizes, 1971 : 48-49 on organizational pluralism in Yugoslav 
self-managing enterprises). 
The analysis suggests that popular discussion of ways of increasing 
the « effectiveness » particularly of consultative committees by appointing 
« more dynamic » Chairmen is seriously misleading. It is misleading 
first of ail because it does not take account of the processes of sélection 
involved, which give the organizations associated with a consultative 
committee the opportunity to influence the final choice. But, more 
importantly it dœs not take account of the distribution of leadership 
functions within the committee itself, among the chairmen of Working 
Parties and between the officiais and the Chairman. If the committees 
are to hâve a « consultative » rôle, then « intégration > and not crude 
« effectiveness » is the key variable to be considered. « Participation » 
and « intégration » are also inextricably related. 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
A common criticism of consultative committees of the type observed 
is that they are too large and unwieldy to be effective problem-solving 
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instruments. As the ones described in this paper were the same size as 
the average Yugoslav Workers' Council this point could also be levelled 
at them. Research évidence suggests that smaller groups are indeed more 
efficient vehicles for complex detailed work. But to accept the criticism 
would be to misunderstand the nature and functions of the committees. 
Their size is determined by their quasi-representative character. (See 
Malles, 1971 : 17). Their functions include deciding on a programme 
of work, selecting ways of tackling spécifie problems, monitoring the 
progress of Working Parties and considering whether to accept their 
reports. To satisjy thèse goals, adéquate consultation and consensus are 
necessary conditions, and group intégration is a prerequisite of both. 
While, in practice, much of the detailed work was observed to be handled 
by Working Parties which are much smaller and more specialised than 
the full bodies, it would be wrong to conclude that the committees merely 
« rubber stamp » what their Working Parties produce. 
One of the most interesting features of consultative meetings is 
the seriousness with which any signs of overt conflict were treated, and 
this is a very relevant point of comparison with earlier work. (Fenno, 
1962 : 366-367). Even though the frequency of conflict was low, great 
care was taken to deal with trivial incidents openly and sympathetically. 
(cf. Adizes, 1971 : 126-127). The implication to be drawn from this 
is that the participants regarded any sign of conflict as damaging to the 
performance and stability of the committees. It can be suggested that 
because they dépend on voluntary co-operation, they must ensure that 
they approach controversial subjects with caution. 
// this is so, then the argument that they are merely extensions of 
the bargaining processes is false. The context dœs not provide the 
conditions required for imposing or negotiating binding décisions in 
conflict or bargaining situations. Where broad inter-organizational in-
tégration is involved, unlike the United States Congressional Committee 
context, there is a greater need for intra-committee quiescence. The 
more heterogeneous the committee, the less it can sustain conflict bar-
gaining. 
Consultative committee members appear to accept a « norm of 
unanimity » whereby disagreement or controversy, when it dœs occur, 
is not reported either to the public or to a committee if it occurs in a 
Working Party. In this way the integrity of the committees is safeguarded 
against the effects of unproductive conflict at the price of limiting, to 
some degree, the areas in which they work. 
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It is often argued that consultative committees would benefit from 
more « dynamic » leadership. Observation of consultative bodies suggests 
that the dominant leadership style is conciliatory, supportive and non-
directive (in ail, reinforcing group intégration) rather than active, 
directive and structuring, even though it might appear in some cases 
(at first sight at least) that the latter would produce better results. Apart 
from the fact that consultative committees are diffident about dealing 
with areas of conflict, this argument overlooks the degree to which 
leadership functions are usually shared. One may compare the above 
with an account of the Workers' Council meetings in a Yugoslav firm 
where an « appropriate » leadership style used by both the Président 
of the Council (and the Director) produced consensus (see Adizes, 
1971 : 127). 
The broad conclusions, which other observers hâve reached about 
committee behaviour, seem to hâve been borne out in our observation 
of consultative committees. (see Fenno, 1962 : 366-367). Committee 
intégration seems to be the key variable involved and this paper has 
attempted to link it to leadership style, a relationship not developed as 
fully in previous work. 
The problems of committee intégration involved are far greater 
than in the législative context previously discussed. One common point, 
however, is that one of the conséquences of high intégration is that 
individuals and spécifie sub-groups hâve relatively restricted power to 
influence décisions, although they may hâve varying observed degrees 
of influence, (cf. Adizes, 1971 : 249 concerning the Director's actual 
behaviour in Governing Board meetings in Yugoslav enterprises). The 
price of intégration and the consensus (see Malles, 1971 : 33). For 
which it is a prerequisite, is to circumscribe « effectiveness » perceived 
in any « simpliste » manner. Organizational maintenance is a primary, 
if not manifest, goal in the context. Intégration, as had been pointed 
out elsewhere, is a « stabilizing force» (Fenno, 1962 : 380). But con-
sultative committee hâve less of a problem with respect to organizational 
survival from endogenous variables than from the exogenous ones, but 
the discussion of the latter is, however, beyond the boundaries of this 
paper. 
One of the conséquences of high intégration is that individuals 
and spécifie sub-groups hâve relatively restricted power to affect déci-
sions, although they hâve varying degrees of influence. If « effectiveness » 
is contingent on intégration, then no group participating must feel ignored 
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or suppressed in any significant way. But this means that say the trade 
unions become a de facto « veto-group ». 
In the type of participation discussed in this paper, any one sub-
group can define the parameters of discussion and even possible deci-
sion-making. The « leader » can influence the degree to which this is 
done it is true, and the more conciliatory the Chairman say, the better. 
The fact that workers' représentatives sit on any kind of consultative 
or participative machinery in itselj ensures that they can exercise a 
latent (or indeed manifest) function as a « veto-group ». This gener-
alization would hold for the type of participative consultation discussed 
in this paper, (at one end of the spectrum) to that existing in say, a 
Yugoslav self-managed enterprise (at the other). Whether or not, the 
workers' représentatives can înitiate much is another question. The type 
of rôle the unions exercised in the committees studied was workers' 
« control » only in the French sensé of the word, meaning to « check » 
things, (see Blumberg, 1968 : 192). The avoidance of conflict and the 
« norm of unanimity » however meant that they kept within mutually 
agreed parameters of discussion and decision-making. 
Participation is not however necessarily a good thing in itself. It 
dépends on who participâtes, where, how and on what terms. If trade 
unions are to participate in any social system, they must décide if the 
terms of référence of the committee will allow them to best achieve 
their goals. If they cannot impose or negotiate binding décisions in 
conflict or bargaining situations, then they may be doing no more than 
participating in a « talking-shop ». This may do little harm, and they 
may even exercise « veto-group » power in effect : — but it is not real 
participation. Anyway, participation is a necessary but not sufficient 
condition of « real » control. Nonetheless group intégration is a pre-
requisite for any kind of problem-solving, even for an effective « talking-
shop ». Any kind of participative committee requires it, and there is an 
appropriate leadership style that best promotes it. 
Thus, the conclusions regarding the group processes and leadership 
style discussed hère would be very relevant to the effective functioning 
of consultative committees at any point along the spectrum of parti-
cipation, whether in one socio-economic system or another, whether at 
plant, industry or national levels. 
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Le processus de la participation aux décisions dans 
les conseils consultatifs 
L'auteur étudie dans cet article le processus de la participation aux décisions 
dans les conseils consultatifs institués dans l'industrie en Grande-Bretagne, mais, 
au cours de son exposé, il se réfère souvent à l'expérience des conseils ouvriers 
en Yougoslavie et à ce qui existe aussi aux États-Unis. 
Il s'agit ici des conseils consultatifs industriels anglais, mieux connus sous 
le nom de conseils Whitley, dont font paritairement partie des représentants des 
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employeurs, des syndicats, des ministères intéressés et du public sous la direction 
d'un président indépendant. Ces conseils comptent de vingt à vingt-trois membres 
et l'étude a porté sur une vingtaine d'entre eux. 
La première exigence à laquelle les conseils doivent répondre pour fonctionner 
normalement, c'est l'intégration de leurs membres, même s'ils viennent de milieux 
différents et d'organismes qui sont naturellement en conflit. Comment des élé-
ments aussi divers peuvent-ils s'engrener? Aucun système politique ne peut être 
parfaitement intégré, mais aucun système politique ne peut survivre sans un degré 
minimum d'intégration de ses différentes parties. Il faut découvrir la formule 
qui permette au comité de restreindre au minimum les conflits et de résoudre 
ceux qui se soulèvent. 
D'autre part, on ne peut séparer la question de l'intégration de l'importance 
numérique du conseil. De l'analyse qui a été faite, il ressort qu'un conseil est 
d'autant plus efficace que le nombre de ses membres est moins considérable. Un 
conseil fonctionne mieux s'il compte cinq membres que s'il en compte douze. 
Il ne s'ensuit pas nécessairement qu'un conseil soit désavantagé à cause de ses 
dimensions, parce qu'il est toujours possible de le subdiviser en sous-comités. 
Il paraît évident que des groupes nombreux ne peuvent pas prendre des dé-
cisions aussi rapidement qu'une poignée d'individus. Au fond, les dimensions 
d'un comité doivent répondre à une double exigence: être suffisamment repré-
sentatifs des intérêts en jeu et être en mesure de donner accès aux divers canaux 
de communication. Une réduction draconienne de l'importance numérique d'un 
conseil peut le couper de ses sources d'information au point de lui enlever tout 
caractère vraiment représentatif. 
Il découle, toutefois, des études qui ont été faites que les conseils consultatifs 
comptent trop de membres pour s'occuper des questions de détail et qu'il est 
nécessaire d'instituer des sous-groupes. 
Les sous-groupes profitent des avantages de la division du travail; ils per-
mettent à un nombre plus restreint de membres de consacrer leur activité à un 
travail précis et spécifique et d'y donner davantage de temps. Ceci ne veut pas 
dire que le conseil lui-même est inutile. Il peut remplir plusieurs fonctions dont 
la principale est assurément de tracer le programme de travail. Les autres consis-
tent à cerner les problèmes, à suivre le cheminement du travail et, finalement, 
à étudier les rapports soumis par les sous-groupes, à les approuver et à décider 
s'ils doivent être communiqués au public. 
La deuxième partie de l'article traite du processus de décision lui-même. 
Le système de relations qui s'établit à l'intérieur des conseils consiste en quelque 
sorte en une mixture de coopération, de concurrence et de conflit, d'où la 
nécessité d'une bonne coordination afin d'identifier les questions d'intérêt commun 
et d'éviter autant que possible les zones de conflit. 
On applique généralement la règle de l'unanimité, cette stratégie permettant 
d'éviter les conséquences néfastes de conflits internes qui pourraient aller jusqu'à 
mettre la survivance du conseil en jeu. De fait, les conseils fonctionnent vraiment 
suivant cette théorie. Ceux-ci visent aussi à promouvoir la coopération parmi les 
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divers organismes qui sont habituellement interdépendants. L'efficacité des conseils 
dépend de la coopération volontaire et de la persuasion, parce qu'ils n'ont ni 
les moyens ni l'autorité de faire obéir les participants. De fait, les conflits 
manifestes sont fort rares et s'il s'en produit, on en dispose avec beaucoup de dis-
crétion. Les organisations qui en font partie se rendent compte que si elles veulent 
exercer une action valable, elles de doivent d'agir ensemble. 
Comme, cependant, tous les conflits ne peuvent être prévenus ni supprimés, 
il faut trouver des moyens de les contrôler et de les canaliser. Il y a deux façons 
de les régler, soit par l'intervention du président, soit par l'acceptation par tous 
les participants de la règle de l'unanimité. Généralement, le président fait appel 
aux raisons mêmes de l'existence des conseils pour atténuer les conflits, parce 
que les centres d'intérêt mutuel ne sont pas toujours apparents au niveau des 
discussions. Il importe donc de découvrir les points de vue des groupes en 
présence et d'apprécier l'intérêt qu'ils peuvent avoir pour un sujet avant d'en 
entreprendre l'étude. 
Ceci soulève évidemment des problèmes de direction et de participation. Une 
définition du concept de leadership exige nécessairement une analyse approfondie 
de la structure des conseils. On peut définir le leadership comme un ensemble 
de rapports par lesquels une personne dirige, coordonne et supervise le travail 
d'autres personnes en vue de la réalisation d'une tâche commune. Le style de 
direction peut donc osciller entre deux pôles. À un extrême, le chef peut simple-
ment dire aux gens quoi faire et comment faire; à l'autre, il peut partager ses 
responsabilités avec les participants et leur confier la planification et l'exécution 
de la tâche. La question capitale, c'est l'identification des situations particulières 
auxquelles peuvent se prêter différentes formes de leadership. On a décelé trois 
types de situations principales qui sont de nature à influencer la coopération à 
l'intérieur d'un groupe: les relations entre le directeur et les membres, la tâche 
à accomplir et les pouvoirs du chef. 
Le degré de confiance des membres envers le chef a une grande influence 
sur l'acceptation de ses directives et de ses initiatives. L'observation des réunions 
permet de se rendre compte qu'il y a une différence marquée entre les conseils 
consultatifs dans lesquels les relations entre la direction et les membres sont 
bonnes et ceux où ces relations laissent à désirer. 
Vient ensuite la question de la tâche à accomplir qui touche la façon dont 
celle-ci est définie et les moyens dont on dispose pour la mener à bien. Lorsqu'une 
action est présentée aux membres du conseil d'une manière limpide, elle permet 
au directeur d'exercer une influence plus efficace. Évidemment, les tâches à 
accomplir ne présentent pas toutes le même degré de clarté. Certaines apparais-
sent plus ou moins précises, plus ou moins nettement délimitées. La raison en est 
que les conseils consultatifs sont autonomes et qu'il est parfois difficile de choisir 
les questions qu'il convient d'étudier et de les bien cerner. 
Enfin, les pouvoirs qui sont accordés à un chef ont un impact certain sur 
son influence. Si celui-ci a une autorité sur son groupe, s'il peut répartir les 
ressources au nom des membres, sa position est meilleure. On a observé que les 
présidents des conseils consultatifs ne disposent pas de pareils pouvoirs, ce qui 
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signifie que leur prestige est assez bas. Ils jouent un peu le rôle de garde-
barrières. Contrairement à la procédure syndicale où l'on peut recourir au vote, 
les conseils consultatifs cherchent plutôt à trouver un consensus. En un sens, il 
s'agit d'un processus moins démocratique et il peut parfois exister une manipulation 
des conseils par l'exploitation des sentiments de groupe. Officiellement, les pré-
sidents des conseils sont indépendants du fait qu'ils n'ont aucun intérêt matériel 
dans les problèmes qui sont étudiés. En pratique, leur situation est bien différente, 
parce que les présidents sont désignés à la suite de sondages et de consultations 
de manière à découvrir des candidats qui soient acceptables à tous les groupe-
ments qui forment le conseil. En réalité, c'est souvent l'acceptabilité plutôt que 
l'indépendance qui est le critère déterminant de sélection. 
En règle générale, le président adapte le style de son leaderschip aux condi-
ditions particulières des divers conseils. Les présidents agissent avec souplesse sans 
s'en rapporter à des règles de procédures strictes, ce qui ne les empêche pas 
d'orienter la discussion, de couper court aux digressions sans pour autant exiger 
des propositions formelles de la part de membres pris individuellement. La 
soumission des propositions est une affaire d'importance vitale, car il est toujours 
difficile à un groupe d'accepter ce qui ne peut être que l'expression d'opinion d'un 
membre. L'absence de règles fixes relatives à la convocation des assemblées et 
à la conduite des débats a tendance à favoriser l'installation d'un pouvoir perma-
nent au sein de l'assemblée. 
En résumé, on peut dire que c'est une forme d'autorité exercée par conciliation 
et par consensus qui prédomine, mais il y a une certaine variation d'un conseil à 
l'autre. Cette formule favorise l'intégration du groupe, et ceci s'impose d'autant 
plus que les conseils sont consultatifs et constitués de personnes qui appartiennent 
à des organisations disparates et parfois opposées. Dans bien des conseils, cette 
forme d'autorité pluraliste semble faciliter le rôle du président. De l'analyse qui 
a été faite, il ressort que la désignation de présidents plus dynamiques serait 
une erreur, parce qu'elle ne tiendrait pas compte du système de sélection utilisé 
et, surtout, de la répartition des fonctions entre les parties constituantes. 
Que faut-il conclure de cette analyse? D'abord que les conseils consultatifs 
comptent trop de membres et qu'ils sont trop maniables pour être un instrument 
efficace de règlement des problèmes. Des conseils moins lourds seraient mieux 
placés pour abattre de la bonne besogne, mais ne serait-ce pas là se méprendre 
sur la nature et la fonction des conseils? En outre, même si l'on a observé que 
les conflits étaient peu nombreux, on ne peut s'empêcher de remarquer que la 
crainte d'avoir à affronter des situations explosives incite les conseils à aborder 
avec beaucoup de prudence les sujets controversés, ce qui laisse sous-entendre 
que l'opinion selon laquelle ils ne seraient qu'une extension des comités de 
négociation est fausse. D'autre part, plus un conseil est hétérogène, moins il lui 
est facile d'aborder les questions controversées. Et lorsque quelques-unes d'entre 
elles viennent à la surface, on s'efforcera d'éviter qu'elles transpirent dans le 
public. L'intégration joue un rôle important. C'est pourquoi les individus et les 
sous-groupes n'ont pas beaucoup de possibilités d'influencer les décisions, quoique 
l'on puisse noter des variantes considérables entre les différents degrés d'influence. 
On remarque enfin que les représentants des syndicats y exercent en pratique un 
quasi droit de veto. 
